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author | Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> | 2023-01-16 20:58:26 +0100 |
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committer | Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> | 2023-01-24 16:55:53 +0100 |
commit | f98a070c8d163b39c1d170166a0d5cb35b74445d (patch) | |
tree | 571ae400a969f0da5eb3d597e9d8bbafcacce57d /examples | |
parent | 9ae4fb5436eb25771be0330eed996951de96fa79 (diff) | |
download | pam-f98a070c8d163b39c1d170166a0d5cb35b74445d.tar.gz pam-f98a070c8d163b39c1d170166a0d5cb35b74445d.tar.bz2 pam-f98a070c8d163b39c1d170166a0d5cb35b74445d.zip |
pam_selinux: treat getenforce failures as enforcing
security_getenforce(3) can return -1 on error; either because the
selinuxfs is not mounted or reading from /sys/fs/selinux/enforce failed.
Since security_getenforce(3) is either called after an approving call to
is_selinux_enabled(3) in create_context() or with populated module
data in restore_context(), which requires a previous pass of
create_context(), the selinuxfs should be mounted.
Reading from /sys/fs/selinux/enforce should never fail (except being
prohibited by the SElinux policy itself) since it is a public interface.
In the unlikely case of security_getenforce(3) nevertheless failing
continue execution as if the result was enforcing (likewise to
pam_sepermit and pam_rootok).
Diffstat (limited to 'examples')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions