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author | Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@thkukuk.de> | 2015-06-22 14:53:01 +0200 |
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committer | Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@thkukuk.de> | 2015-06-22 14:53:01 +0200 |
commit | e89d4c97385ff8180e6e81e84c5aa745daf28a79 (patch) | |
tree | 17ef8bacb38a0f60a7476420ab62627cc8af440c /modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c | |
parent | f4fbbbcc52696d67ebe57ee8214fbbdf4c479dbc (diff) | |
download | pam-e89d4c97385ff8180e6e81e84c5aa745daf28a79.tar.gz pam-e89d4c97385ff8180e6e81e84c5aa745daf28a79.tar.bz2 pam-e89d4c97385ff8180e6e81e84c5aa745daf28a79.zip |
Release version 1.2.1
Security fix: CVE-2015-3238
If the process executing pam_sm_authenticate or pam_sm_chauthtok method
of pam_unix is not privileged enough to check the password, e.g.
if selinux is enabled, the _unix_run_helper_binary function is called.
When a long enough password is supplied (16 pages or more, i.e. 65536+
bytes on a system with 4K pages), this helper function hangs
indefinitely, blocked in the write(2) call while writing to a blocking
pipe that has a limited capacity.
With this fix, the verifiable password length will be limited to
PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE bytes (i.e. 512 bytes) for pam_exec and pam_unix.
* NEWS: Update
* configure.ac: Bump version
* modules/pam_exec/pam_exec.8.xml: document limitation of password length
* modules/pam_exec/pam_exec.c: limit password length to PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE
* modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml: document limitation of password length
* modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c: limit password length
* modules/pam_unix/passverify.c: Likewise
* modules/pam_unix/passverify.h: Likewise
* modules/pam_unix/support.c: Likewise
Diffstat (limited to 'modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c')
-rw-r--r-- | modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c | 23 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c index 2d330e51..c2e5de5e 100644 --- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c +++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c @@ -240,15 +240,22 @@ static int _unix_run_update_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const /* wait for child */ /* if the stored password is NULL */ int rc=0; - if (fromwhat) - pam_modutil_write(fds[1], fromwhat, strlen(fromwhat)+1); - else - pam_modutil_write(fds[1], "", 1); - if (towhat) { - pam_modutil_write(fds[1], towhat, strlen(towhat)+1); + if (fromwhat) { + int len = strlen(fromwhat); + + if (len > PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE) + len = PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE; + pam_modutil_write(fds[1], fromwhat, len); } - else - pam_modutil_write(fds[1], "", 1); + pam_modutil_write(fds[1], "", 1); + if (towhat) { + int len = strlen(towhat); + + if (len > PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE) + len = PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE; + pam_modutil_write(fds[1], towhat, len); + } + pam_modutil_write(fds[1], "", 1); close(fds[0]); /* close here to avoid possible SIGPIPE above */ close(fds[1]); |