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authorChristian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>2023-01-30 17:56:58 +0100
committerChristian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>2023-02-28 15:13:15 +0100
commitbcba17939e1b1a568cd4a764534cde74d37078cc (patch)
tree4f3630f53cd52c2afa59435f5d36db260c1bf4a1 /modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
parent87ff7a12a55c38873905636eb8d29b4542d828f5 (diff)
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modules: make use of secure memory erasure
Use empty initialization of structs to minimize the memset() usage, to reduce the amount of calls which are not sensitive. Non trivial changes: - pam_env: * erase environment variables where possible - pam_exec: * erase responce on error * erase auth token - pam_pwhistory: * erase buffers containing old passwords - pam_selinux: skip overwriting data structure consisting of only pointers to insensitive data, which also gets free'd afterwards (so it currently does not protect against double-free or use-after-free on the member pointers) - pam_unix: erase cipher data in more places - pam_userdb: erase password hashes
Diffstat (limited to 'modules/pam_unix/passverify.c')
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/passverify.c19
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
index c8ab49f3..81b10d88 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(int verify_pwd_hash,
} else if (*hash != '$' && hash_len >= 13) {
pp = bigcrypt(p, hash);
if (pp && hash_len == 13 && strlen(pp) > hash_len) {
- _pam_overwrite(pp + hash_len);
+ pam_overwrite_string(pp + hash_len);
}
} else {
/*
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(int verify_pwd_hash,
if (cdata != NULL) {
cdata->initialized = 0;
pp = x_strdup(crypt_r(p, hash, cdata));
- memset(cdata, '\0', sizeof(*cdata));
+ pam_overwrite_object(cdata);
free(cdata);
}
#else
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_hash,
#else
char salt[64]; /* contains rounds number + max 16 bytes of salt + algo id */
#endif
- char *sp;
+ char *sp, *ret;
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
struct crypt_data *cdata = NULL;
#endif
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_hash,
password = tmppass;
}
hashed = bigcrypt(password, salt);
- memset(tmppass, '\0', sizeof(tmppass));
+ pam_overwrite_array(tmppass);
password = NULL;
return hashed;
}
@@ -494,18 +494,21 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_hash,
on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl) ? "sha256" :
on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl) ? "sha512" : algoid);
if(sp) {
- memset(sp, '\0', strlen(sp));
+ pam_overwrite_string(sp);
}
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ pam_overwrite_object(cdata);
free(cdata);
#endif
return NULL;
}
- sp = x_strdup(sp);
+ ret = strdup(sp);
+ pam_overwrite_string(sp);
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ pam_overwrite_object(cdata);
free(cdata);
#endif
- return sp;
+ return ret;
}
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -1090,7 +1093,7 @@ helper_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok)
}
if (hash) {
- _pam_overwrite(hash);
+ pam_overwrite_string(hash);
_pam_drop(hash);
}