diff options
author | Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@thkukuk.de> | 2005-05-16 11:03:02 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@thkukuk.de> | 2005-05-16 11:03:02 +0000 |
commit | 67aab1ff5515054341a438cf9804e9c9b3a88033 (patch) | |
tree | 5a962491b37bde5928d382b6df1e4e5a5373df6a /modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c | |
parent | b4eda70f951a7d46df41831b96d87cd50910d61e (diff) | |
download | pam-67aab1ff5515054341a438cf9804e9c9b3a88033.tar.gz pam-67aab1ff5515054341a438cf9804e9c9b3a88033.tar.bz2 pam-67aab1ff5515054341a438cf9804e9c9b3a88033.zip |
Relevant BUGIDs: none
Purpose of commit: new feature
Commit summary:
---------------
Add SELinux support, based on Patch from Red Hat
Diffstat (limited to 'modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c')
-rw-r--r-- | modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c | 295 |
1 files changed, 251 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c index ff1d1bff..2ad95362 100644 --- a/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c +++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c @@ -28,12 +28,23 @@ #include <syslog.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> #include <pwd.h> #include <shadow.h> #include <signal.h> +#include <time.h> +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX +#include <selinux/selinux.h> +#define SELINUX_ENABLED (selinux_enabled!=-1 ? selinux_enabled : (selinux_enabled=is_selinux_enabled()>0)) +static security_context_t prev_context=NULL; +static int selinux_enabled=-1; +#else +#define SELINUX_ENABLED 0 +#endif #define MAXPASS 200 /* the maximum length of a password */ +#include <security/_pam_types.h> #include <security/_pam_macros.h> #include "md5.h" @@ -41,9 +52,6 @@ extern char *crypt(const char *key, const char *salt); extern char *bigcrypt(const char *key, const char *salt); -#define UNIX_PASSED 0 -#define UNIX_FAILED 1 - /* syslogging function for errors and other information */ static void _log_err(int err, const char *format,...) @@ -112,13 +120,40 @@ static void setup_signals(void) (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &action, NULL); } +static int _verify_account(const char * const uname) +{ + struct spwd *spent; + struct passwd *pwent; + + pwent = getpwnam(uname); + if (!pwent) { + _log_err(LOG_ALERT, "could not identify user (from getpwnam(%s))", uname); + return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN; + } + + spent = getspnam( uname ); + if (!spent) { + _log_err(LOG_ALERT, "could not get username from shadow (%s))", uname); + return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL; /* Couldn't get username from shadow */ + } + printf("%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld", + spent->sp_lstchg, /* last password change */ + spent->sp_min, /* days until change allowed. */ + spent->sp_max, /* days before change required */ + spent->sp_warn, /* days warning for expiration */ + spent->sp_inact, /* days before account inactive */ + spent->sp_expire); /* date when account expires */ + + return PAM_SUCCESS; +} + static int _unix_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok) { struct passwd *pwd = NULL; struct spwd *spwdent = NULL; char *salt = NULL; char *pp = NULL; - int retval = UNIX_FAILED; + int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR; int salt_len; /* UNIX passwords area */ @@ -156,28 +191,30 @@ static int _unix_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok) if (pwd == NULL || salt == NULL) { _log_err(LOG_ALERT, "check pass; user unknown"); p = NULL; - return retval; + return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN; } salt_len = strlen(salt); - if (salt_len == 0) - return (nullok == 0) ? UNIX_FAILED : UNIX_PASSED; - else if (p == NULL || strlen(p) == 0) - return UNIX_FAILED; + if (salt_len == 0) { + return (nullok == 0) ? PAM_AUTH_ERR : PAM_SUCCESS; + } + if (p == NULL || strlen(p) == 0) { + return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR; + } /* the moment of truth -- do we agree with the password? */ - retval = UNIX_FAILED; + retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR; if (!strncmp(salt, "$1$", 3)) { pp = Goodcrypt_md5(p, salt); if (strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) { - retval = UNIX_PASSED; + retval = PAM_SUCCESS; } else { pp = Brokencrypt_md5(p, salt); if (strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) - retval = UNIX_PASSED; + retval = PAM_SUCCESS; } } else if ((*salt == '*') || (salt_len < 13)) { - retval = UNIX_FAILED; + retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR; } else { pp = bigcrypt(p, salt); /* @@ -190,7 +227,7 @@ static int _unix_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok) * Bug 521314: the strncmp comparison is for legacy support. */ if (strncmp(pp, salt, salt_len) == 0) { - retval = UNIX_PASSED; + retval = PAM_SUCCESS; } } p = NULL; /* no longer needed here */ @@ -220,17 +257,178 @@ static char *getuidname(uid_t uid) strncpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username)); username[sizeof(username) - 1] = '\0'; - + return username; } +#define SH_TMPFILE "/etc/nshadow" +static int _update_shadow(const char *forwho) +{ + struct spwd *spwdent = NULL, *stmpent = NULL; + FILE *pwfile, *opwfile; + int err = 1; + int oldmask; + struct stat st; + char pass[MAXPASS + 1]; + char towhat[MAXPASS + 1]; + int npass=0; + + /* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */ + + npass = read(STDIN_FILENO, pass, MAXPASS); + + if (npass < 0) { /* is it a valid password? */ + + _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no password supplied"); + return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR; + + } else if (npass >= MAXPASS) { + + _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "password too long"); + return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR; + + } else { + /* does pass agree with the official one? */ + int retval=0; + pass[npass] = '\0'; /* NUL terminate */ + retval = _unix_verify_password(forwho, pass, 0); + if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { + return retval; + } + } + + /* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */ + + npass = read(STDIN_FILENO, towhat, MAXPASS); + + if (npass < 0) { /* is it a valid password? */ + + _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no new password supplied"); + return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR; + + } else if (npass >= MAXPASS) { + + _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "new password too long"); + return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR; + + } + + towhat[npass] = '\0'; /* NUL terminate */ + spwdent = getspnam(forwho); + if (spwdent == NULL) { + return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN; + } + oldmask = umask(077); + +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX + if (SELINUX_ENABLED) { + security_context_t shadow_context=NULL; + if (getfilecon("/etc/shadow",&shadow_context)<0) { + return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR; + }; + if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) { + freecon(shadow_context); + return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR; + } + if (setfscreatecon(shadow_context)) { + freecon(shadow_context); + freecon(prev_context); + return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR; + } + freecon(shadow_context); + } +#endif + pwfile = fopen(SH_TMPFILE, "w"); + umask(oldmask); + if (pwfile == NULL) { + err = 1; + goto done; + } + + opwfile = fopen("/etc/shadow", "r"); + if (opwfile == NULL) { + fclose(pwfile); + err = 1; + goto done; + } + + if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) { + fclose(opwfile); + fclose(pwfile); + err = 1; + goto done; + } + + if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) { + fclose(opwfile); + fclose(pwfile); + err = 1; + goto done; + } + if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) { + fclose(opwfile); + fclose(pwfile); + err = 1; + goto done; + } + + stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile); + while (stmpent) { + + if (!strcmp(stmpent->sp_namp, forwho)) { + stmpent->sp_pwdp = towhat; + stmpent->sp_lstchg = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24); + err = 0; + D(("Set password %s for %s", stmpent->sp_pwdp, forwho)); + } + + if (putspent(stmpent, pwfile)) { + D(("error writing entry to shadow file: %s\n", strerror(errno))); + err = 1; + break; + } + + stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile); + } + fclose(opwfile); + + if (fclose(pwfile)) { + D(("error writing entries to shadow file: %s\n", strerror(errno))); + err = 1; + } + + done: + if (!err) { + if (rename(SH_TMPFILE, "/etc/shadow")) + err = 1; + } + +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX + if (SELINUX_ENABLED) { + if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) { + err = 1; + } + if (prev_context) + freecon(prev_context); + prev_context=NULL; + } +#endif + + if (!err) { + return PAM_SUCCESS; + } else { + unlink(SH_TMPFILE); + return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR; + } +} + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char pass[MAXPASS + 1]; - char option[8]; + char *option; int npass, nullok; int force_failure = 0; - int retval = UNIX_FAILED; + int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR; char *user; /* @@ -247,8 +445,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) * account). */ - if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { - + if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO) || argc != 3 ) { _log_err(LOG_NOTICE ,"inappropriate use of Unix helper binary [UID=%d]" ,getuid()); @@ -256,36 +453,46 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) ,"This binary is not designed for running in this way\n" "-- the system administrator has been informed\n"); sleep(10); /* this should discourage/annoy the user */ - return UNIX_FAILED; + return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR; } /* - * determine the current user's name is + * determine the current user's name is. + * On a SELinux enabled system, policy will prevent third parties from using + * unix_chkpwd as a password guesser. Leaving the existing check prevents + * su from working, Since the current uid is the users and the password is + * for root. */ - user = getuidname(getuid()); - if (argc == 2) { - /* if the caller specifies the username, verify that user - matches it */ - if (strcmp(user, argv[1])) { - force_failure = 1; - } + if (SELINUX_ENABLED) { + user=argv[1]; + } + else { + user = getuidname(getuid()); + /* if the caller specifies the username, verify that user + matches it */ + if (strcmp(user, argv[1])) { + return PAM_AUTH_ERR; + } } - /* read the nullok/nonull option */ + option=argv[2]; - npass = read(STDIN_FILENO, option, 8); + if (strncmp(argv[2], "verify", 8) == 0) { + /* Get the account information from the shadow file */ + return _verify_account(argv[1]); + } - if (npass < 0) { - _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no option supplied"); - return UNIX_FAILED; - } else { - option[7] = '\0'; - if (strncmp(option, "nullok", 8) == 0) - nullok = 1; - else - nullok = 0; + if (strncmp(option, "shadow", 8) == 0) { + /* Attempting to change the password */ + return _update_shadow(argv[1]); } + /* read the nullok/nonull option */ + if (strncmp(option, "nullok", 8) == 0) + nullok = 1; + else + nullok = 0; + /* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */ npass = read(STDIN_FILENO, pass, MAXPASS); @@ -317,10 +524,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) /* return pass or fail */ - if ((retval != UNIX_PASSED) || force_failure) { - return UNIX_FAILED; + if ((retval != PAM_SUCCESS) || force_failure) { + return PAM_AUTH_ERR; } else { - return UNIX_PASSED; + return PAM_SUCCESS; } } @@ -339,13 +546,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote * products derived from this software without specific prior * written permission. - * + * * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) - * + * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE |