Fix whitespace issues

Cleanup trailing whitespaces, indentation that uses spaces before tabs,
and blank lines at EOF.  Make the project free of warnings reported by
git diff --check 4b825dc642cb6eb9a060e54bf8d69288fbee4904 HEAD

9 files changed, 25 insertions, 27 deletions

diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/CHANGELOG b/modules/pam_unix/CHANGELOG
index 1476b579..c18acc27 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/CHANGELOG
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/CHANGELOG
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ $Id$
 - temporarily removed the crypt16 stuff. I'm really paranoid about
   crypto stuff and exporting it, and there are a few too many 's-box'
   references in the code for my liking..
- 
+
 * Wed Jun 30 1999 Steve Langasek <vorlon@netexpress.net>
 - further NIS+ fixes
 
@@ -50,6 +50,5 @@ $Id$
   is too lame to use it in real life)
 
 * Sun Mar 21 1999 Jan Rêkorajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
-- pam_unix_auth now correctly behave when user has NULL AUTHTOK 
+- pam_unix_auth now correctly behave when user has NULL AUTHTOK
 - pam_unix_auth returns PAM_PERM_DENIED when seteuid fails
-
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c
index 9922d177..e10d1c56 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c
@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
 /*
  * This function implements the "bigcrypt" algorithm specifically for
  * Linux-PAM.
- *  
+ *
  * This algorithm is algorithm 0 (default) shipped with the C2 secure
  * implementation of Digital UNIX.
- * 
+ *
  * Disclaimer: This work is not based on the source code to Digital
  * UNIX, nor am I connected to Digital Equipment Corp, in any way
  * other than as a customer. This code is based on published
  * interfaces and reasonable guesswork.
- * 
+ *
  * Description: The cleartext is divided into blocks of SEGMENT_SIZE=8
  * characters or less. Each block is encrypted using the standard UNIX
  * libc crypt function. The result of the encryption for one block
  * provides the salt for the suceeding block.
- * 
+ *
  * Restrictions: The buffer used to hold the encrypted result is
  * statically allocated. (see MAX_PASS_LEN below).  This is necessary,
  * as the returned pointer points to "static data that are overwritten
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/md5.c b/modules/pam_unix/md5.c
index 94d1c9da..7881db5d 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/md5.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/md5.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ void MD5Name(MD5Update)(struct MD5Context *ctx, unsigned const char *buf, unsign
 }
 
 /*
- * Final wrapup - pad to 64-byte boundary with the bit pattern 
+ * Final wrapup - pad to 64-byte boundary with the bit pattern
  * 1 0* (64-bit count of bits processed, MSB-first)
  */
 void MD5Name(MD5Final)(unsigned char digest[16], struct MD5Context *ctx)
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
index d9c4ea55..1379d96c 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ pam_sm_setcred (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags UNUSED,
 	   don't worry about an explicit check of argv. */
 	if (pam_get_data(pamh, "unix_setcred_return", &pretval) == PAM_SUCCESS
 	    && pretval) {
- 	        retval = *(const int *)pretval;
+	        retval = *(const int *)pretval;
 		pam_set_data(pamh, "unix_setcred_return", NULL, NULL);
 		D(("recovered data indicates that old retval was %d", retval));
 	}
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
index 631df318..6ba2c2e6 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int _unix_run_update_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const
 	    rlim.rlim_max = MAX_FD_NO;
 	  for (i=0; i < (int)rlim.rlim_max; i++) {
 	    if (i != STDIN_FILENO)
-	  	   close(i);
+		close(i);
 	  }
 	}
 
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static int _unix_run_update_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const
     } else {
 	D(("fork failed"));
 	close(fds[0]);
- 	close(fds[1]);
+	close(fds[1]);
 	retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
     }
 
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c
index 778062e4..72046ea0 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c
@@ -16,13 +16,13 @@
  * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
  *    products derived from this software without specific prior
  *    written permission.
- * 
+ *
  * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
  * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
  * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
  * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
  * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
- * 
+ *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
  * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
@@ -140,4 +140,3 @@ struct pam_module _pam_unix_session_modstruct = {
     NULL,
 };
 #endif
-
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
index 5199a690..089f4b83 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -89,17 +89,17 @@ verify_pwd_hash(const char *p, char *hash, unsigned int nullok)
 	} else {
 		if (!strncmp(hash, "$1$", 3)) {
 			pp = Goodcrypt_md5(p, hash);
-		    	if (pp && strcmp(pp, hash) != 0) {
+			if (pp && strcmp(pp, hash) != 0) {
 				_pam_delete(pp);
 				pp = Brokencrypt_md5(p, hash);
-		    	}
+			}
 		} else if (*hash != '$' && hash_len >= 13) {
-		    	pp = bigcrypt(p, hash);
-		    	if (pp && hash_len == 13 && strlen(pp) > hash_len) {
+			pp = bigcrypt(p, hash);
+			if (pp && hash_len == 13 && strlen(pp) > hash_len) {
 				_pam_overwrite(pp + hash_len);
-		    	}
+			}
 		} else {
-                	/*
+			/*
 			 * Ok, we don't know the crypt algorithm, but maybe
 			 * libcrypt knows about it? We should try it.
 			 */
@@ -448,12 +448,12 @@ unix_selinux_confined(void)
     char tempfile[]="/etc/.pwdXXXXXX";
 
     if (confined != -1)
-    	return confined;
+	return confined;
 
     /* cannot be confined without SELinux enabled */
     if (!SELINUX_ENABLED){
-       	confined = 0;
-       	return confined;
+	confined = 0;
+	return confined;
     }
 
     /* let's try opening shadow read only */
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ save_old_password(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
 	    char *sptr = NULL;
 	    found = 1;
 	    if (howmany == 0)
-	    	continue;
+		continue;
 	    buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
 	    s_luser = strtok_r(buf, ":", &sptr);
 	    s_uid = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
index cc350e58..ab04535f 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
                 rlim.rlim_max = MAX_FD_NO;
 	  for (i=0; i < (int)rlim.rlim_max; i++) {
 		if (i != STDIN_FILENO)
-	  	   close(i);
+		  close(i);
 	  }
 	}
 
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
     } else {
 	D(("fork failed"));
 	close(fds[0]);
- 	close(fds[1]);
+	close(fds[1]);
 	retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
     }
 
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c
index 702912d0..6ea7ea51 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ set_password(const char *forwho, const char *shadow, const char *remember)
     }
 
     if (lock_pwdf() != PAM_SUCCESS)
-    	return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
 
     pwd = getpwnam(forwho);