diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c | 35 |
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c index 49a70ff3..e17d6f87 100644 --- a/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c +++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c @@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ #include <signal.h> #include <time.h> #include <sys/time.h> +#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT +#include <libaudit.h> +#include "audit.h" +#endif #include <security/_pam_types.h> #include <security/_pam_macros.h> @@ -38,6 +42,7 @@ static int set_password(const char *forwho, const char *shadow, const char *remember) { struct passwd *pwd = NULL; + uid_t ruid; int retval; char pass[PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE + 1]; char towhat[PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE + 1]; @@ -76,11 +81,25 @@ set_password(const char *forwho, const char *shadow, const char *remember) } /* If real caller uid is not root we must verify that - received old pass agrees with the current one. - We always allow change from null pass. */ - if (getuid()) { + * the target user is the caller and the + * received old pass agrees with the current one. + * We always allow change from null pass. */ + ruid = getuid(); + if (ruid != 0) { + if (pwd->pw_uid != ruid) { + helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE, "user mismatch detected: source=%d target=%d", + ruid, pwd->pw_uid); + retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR; + goto done; + } + retval = helper_verify_password(forwho, pass, 1); +#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT + audit_log(AUDIT_USER_AUTH, getuidname(getuid()), retval); +#endif if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { + helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE, "password check failed for user (%s)", + getuidname(getuid())); goto done; } } @@ -100,6 +119,11 @@ set_password(const char *forwho, const char *shadow, const char *remember) retval = unix_update_passwd(forwho, towhat); } +#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT + audit_log(AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, getuidname(getuid()), retval); +#endif + + done: pam_overwrite_array(pass); pam_overwrite_array(towhat); @@ -125,7 +149,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) /* * we establish that this program is running with non-tty stdin. * this is to discourage casual use. It does *NOT* prevent an - * intruder from repeatadly running this program to determine the + * intruder from repeatedly running this program to determine the * password of the current user (brute force attack, but one for * which the attacker must already have gained access to the user's * account). @@ -135,6 +159,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE ,"inappropriate use of Unix helper binary [UID=%d]" ,getuid()); +#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT + audit_log(AUDIT_ANOM_EXEC, getuidname(getuid()), PAM_SYSTEM_ERR); +#endif fprintf(stderr ,"This binary is not designed for running in this way\n" "-- the system administrator has been informed\n"); |