From 4e4d6bb78e3bd6430838d854832c58f104d5f559 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Andrew G. Morgan" Date: Sun, 11 Feb 2001 06:33:53 +0000 Subject: Relevant BUGIDs: 112540 Purpose of commit: minor security bugfix Commit summary: --------------- Fixes for the password helper binaries. Before, there was no check that the password entered was actually that of the intended user being authenticated. Instead, the password was checked for the requesting user. While this disstinction sounds like a security hole, its actually not been a problem in practice. The helper binaries have only been used in the case that the application is not setuid-0 and as such even if an improper authentication succeeded, the application could not change its uid from that of the requesting user. --- modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c') diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c index 5d8d2d7d..3fe8a27a 100644 --- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c +++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c @@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ static int save_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *oldpass, int howman return retval; } -static int _update_passwd(const char *forwho, char *towhat) +static int _update_passwd(const char *forwho, const char *towhat) { struct passwd *tmpent = NULL; FILE *pwfile, *opwfile; @@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ static int _pam_unix_approve_pass(pam_handle_t * pamh ,const char *pass_new) { const char *user; - char *remark = NULL; + const char *remark = NULL; int retval = PAM_SUCCESS; D(("&new=%p, &old=%p", pass_old, pass_new)); -- cgit v1.2.3