New upstream version 0.99.10.0

1 files changed, 1129 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Linux-PAM/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/Linux-PAM/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6d588e63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Linux-PAM/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1129 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright information at end of file.
+ */
+#include "config.h"
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include "support.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+#include <crypt.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "bigcrypt.h"
+#include "passverify.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED is_selinux_enabled()>0
+#else
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED 0
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+#define pam_modutil_getpwnam(h,n) getpwnam(n)
+#define pam_modutil_getspnam(h,n) getspnam(n)
+#define pam_syslog(h,a,b,c) helper_log_err(a,b,c)
+#else
+#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(USE_LCKPWDF) && !defined(HAVE_LCKPWDF)
+# include "./lckpwdf.-c"
+#endif
+
+static void
+strip_hpux_aging(char *hash)
+{
+	static const char valid[] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
+		"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+		"0123456789./";
+	if ((*hash != '$') && (strlen(hash) > 13)) {
+		for (hash += 13; *hash != '\0'; hash++) {
+			if (strchr(valid, *hash) == NULL) {
+				*hash = '\0';
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+int
+verify_pwd_hash(const char *p, char *hash, unsigned int nullok)
+{
+	size_t hash_len;
+	char *pp = NULL;
+	int retval;
+	D(("called"));
+
+	strip_hpux_aging(hash);
+	hash_len = strlen(hash);
+	if (!hash_len) {
+		/* the stored password is NULL */
+		if (nullok) { /* this means we've succeeded */
+			D(("user has empty password - access granted"));
+			retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+		} else {
+			D(("user has empty password - access denied"));
+			retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+		}
+	} else if (!p || *hash == '*' || *hash == '!') {
+		retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	} else {
+		if (!strncmp(hash, "$1$", 3)) {
+			pp = Goodcrypt_md5(p, hash);
+		    	if (pp && strcmp(pp, hash) != 0) {
+				_pam_delete(pp);
+				pp = Brokencrypt_md5(p, hash);
+		    	}
+		} else if (*hash != '$' && hash_len >= 13) {
+		    	pp = bigcrypt(p, hash);
+		    	if (pp && hash_len == 13 && strlen(pp) > hash_len) {
+				_pam_overwrite(pp + hash_len);
+		    	}
+		} else {
+                	/*
+			 * Ok, we don't know the crypt algorithm, but maybe
+			 * libcrypt knows about it? We should try it.
+			 */
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+			struct crypt_data *cdata;
+			cdata = malloc(sizeof(*cdata));
+			if (cdata != NULL) {
+				cdata->initialized = 0;
+				pp = x_strdup(crypt_r(p, hash, cdata));
+				memset(cdata, '\0', sizeof(*cdata));
+				free(cdata);
+			}
+#else
+			pp = x_strdup(crypt(p, hash));
+#endif
+		}
+		p = NULL;		/* no longer needed here */
+
+		/* the moment of truth -- do we agree with the password? */
+		D(("comparing state of pp[%s] and salt[%s]", pp, salt));
+
+		if (pp && strcmp(pp, hash) == 0) {
+			retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+		} else {
+			retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (pp)
+		_pam_delete(pp);
+	D(("done [%d].", retval));
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+int
+is_pwd_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd)
+{
+	if (pwd != NULL) {
+		if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "x") == 0) {
+			return 1;
+		}
+		if ((pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '#') &&
+		    (pwd->pw_passwd[1] == '#') &&
+		    (strcmp(pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_passwd + 2) == 0)) {
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+get_account_info(const char *name,
+	struct passwd **pwd, struct spwd **spwdent)
+#else
+int
+get_account_info(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name,
+	struct passwd **pwd,  struct spwd **spwdent)
+#endif
+{
+	/* UNIX passwords area */
+	*pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, name);	/* Get password file entry... */
+	*spwdent = NULL;
+
+	if (*pwd != NULL) {
+		if (strcmp((*pwd)->pw_passwd, "*NP*") == 0)
+		{ /* NIS+ */
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+			uid_t save_euid, save_uid;
+
+			save_euid = geteuid();
+			save_uid = getuid();
+			if (save_uid == (*pwd)->pw_uid)
+				setreuid(save_euid, save_uid);
+			else  {
+				setreuid(0, -1);
+				if (setreuid(-1, (*pwd)->pw_uid) == -1) {
+					setreuid(-1, 0);
+					setreuid(0, -1);
+					if(setreuid(-1, (*pwd)->pw_uid) == -1)
+						return PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
+				}
+			}
+
+			*spwdent = pam_modutil_getspnam(pamh, name);
+			if (save_uid == (*pwd)->pw_uid)
+				setreuid(save_uid, save_euid);
+			else {
+				setreuid(-1, 0);
+				setreuid(save_uid, -1);
+				setreuid(-1, save_euid);
+			}
+
+			if (*spwdent == NULL || (*spwdent)->sp_pwdp == NULL)
+				return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+#else
+			/* we must run helper for NIS+ passwords */
+			return PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER;
+#endif
+		} else if (is_pwd_shadowed(*pwd)) {
+			/*
+			 * ...and shadow password file entry for this user,
+			 * if shadowing is enabled
+			 */
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+			if (geteuid() || SELINUX_ENABLED)
+				return PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER;
+#endif
+			*spwdent = pam_modutil_getspnam(pamh, name);
+			if (*spwdent == NULL || (*spwdent)->sp_pwdp == NULL)
+				return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+		}
+	} else {
+		return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+get_pwd_hash(const char *name,
+	struct passwd **pwd, char **hash)
+#else
+int
+get_pwd_hash(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name,
+	struct passwd **pwd, char **hash)
+#endif
+{
+	int retval;
+	struct spwd *spwdent = NULL;
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+	retval = get_account_info(name, pwd, &spwdent);
+#else
+	retval = get_account_info(pamh, name, pwd, &spwdent);
+#endif
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		return retval;
+	}
+
+	if (spwdent)
+		*hash = x_strdup(spwdent->sp_pwdp);
+	else
+		*hash = x_strdup((*pwd)->pw_passwd);
+	if (*hash == NULL)
+		return PAM_BUF_ERR;
+
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+check_shadow_expiry(struct spwd *spent, int *daysleft)
+#else
+int
+check_shadow_expiry(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct spwd *spent, int *daysleft)
+#endif
+{
+	long int curdays;
+	*daysleft = -1;
+	curdays = (long int)(time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24));
+	D(("today is %d, last change %d", curdays, spent->sp_lstchg));
+	if ((curdays > spent->sp_expire) && (spent->sp_expire != -1)) {
+		D(("account expired"));
+		return PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+	}
+	if (spent->sp_lstchg == 0) {
+		D(("need a new password"));
+		*daysleft = 0;
+		return PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD;
+	}
+	if (curdays < spent->sp_lstchg) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+			 "account %s has password changed in future",
+			 spent->sp_namp);
+		return PAM_SUCCESS;
+	}
+	if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max)
+	    && (curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_inact)
+	    && (curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max + spent->sp_inact)
+	    && (spent->sp_max != -1) && (spent->sp_inact != -1)) {
+		*daysleft = (int)((spent->sp_lstchg + spent->sp_max) - curdays);
+		D(("authtok expired"));
+		return PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED;
+	}
+	if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max) && (spent->sp_max != -1)) {
+		D(("need a new password 2"));
+		return PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD;
+	}
+	if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max - spent->sp_warn)
+	    && (spent->sp_max != -1) && (spent->sp_warn != -1)) {
+		*daysleft = (int)((spent->sp_lstchg + spent->sp_max) - curdays);
+		D(("warn before expiry"));
+	}
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+}
+
+/* passwd/salt conversion macros */
+
+#define PW_TMPFILE              "/etc/npasswd"
+#define SH_TMPFILE              "/etc/nshadow"
+#define OPW_TMPFILE             "/etc/security/nopasswd"
+
+/*
+ * i64c - convert an integer to a radix 64 character
+ */
+static int
+i64c(int i)
+{
+        if (i < 0)
+                return ('.');
+        else if (i > 63)
+                return ('z');
+        if (i == 0)
+                return ('.');
+        if (i == 1)
+                return ('/');
+        if (i >= 2 && i <= 11)
+                return ('0' - 2 + i);
+        if (i >= 12 && i <= 37)
+                return ('A' - 12 + i);
+        if (i >= 38 && i <= 63)
+                return ('a' - 38 + i);
+        return ('\0');
+}
+
+/* <where> must point to a buffer of at least <length>+1 length */
+static void
+crypt_make_salt(char *where, int length)
+{
+        struct timeval tv;
+        MD5_CTX ctx;
+        unsigned char tmp[16];
+        unsigned char *src = (unsigned char *)where;
+        int i;
+#ifdef PAM_PATH_RANDOMDEV
+	int fd;
+	int rv;
+
+	if ((rv = fd = open(PAM_PATH_RANDOMDEV, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+		while ((rv = read(fd, where, length)) != length && errno == EINTR);
+		close (fd);
+	}
+	if (rv != length) {
+#endif
+        /*
+         * Code lifted from Marek Michalkiewicz's shadow suite. (CG)
+         * removed use of static variables (AGM)
+         *
+	 * will work correctly only for length <= 16 */
+	src = tmp;
+        GoodMD5Init(&ctx);
+        gettimeofday(&tv, (struct timezone *) 0);
+        GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &tv, sizeof tv);
+        i = getpid();
+        GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
+        i = clock();
+        GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
+        GoodMD5Update(&ctx, src, length);
+        GoodMD5Final(tmp, &ctx);
+#ifdef PAM_PATH_RANDOMDEV
+	}
+#endif
+        for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
+                *where++ = i64c(src[i] & 077);
+        *where = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+crypt_md5_wrapper(const char *pass_new)
+{
+        unsigned char result[16];
+        char *cp = (char *) result;
+
+        cp = stpcpy(cp, "$1$");      /* magic for the MD5 */
+	crypt_make_salt(cp, 8);
+
+        /* no longer need cleartext */
+        cp = Goodcrypt_md5(pass_new, (const char *) result);
+	pass_new = NULL;
+
+        return cp;
+}
+
+char *
+create_password_hash(const char *password, unsigned int ctrl, int rounds)
+{
+	const char *algoid;
+	char salt[64]; /* contains rounds number + max 16 bytes of salt + algo id */
+	char *sp;
+
+	if (on(UNIX_MD5_PASS, ctrl)) {
+		return crypt_md5_wrapper(password);
+	}
+	if (on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl)) {
+		algoid = "$5$";
+	} else if (on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl)) {
+		algoid = "$6$";
+	} else { /* must be crypt/bigcrypt */
+		char tmppass[9];
+		char *crypted;
+
+		crypt_make_salt(salt, 2);
+		if (off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT, ctrl) && strlen(password) > 8) {
+			strncpy(tmppass, password, sizeof(tmppass)-1);
+			tmppass[sizeof(tmppass)-1] = '\0';
+			password = tmppass;
+		}
+		crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
+		memset(tmppass, '\0', sizeof(tmppass));
+		password = NULL;
+		return crypted;
+	}
+
+	sp = stpcpy(salt, algoid);
+	if (on(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl)) {
+		sp += snprintf(sp, sizeof(salt) - 3, "rounds=%u$", rounds);
+	}
+	crypt_make_salt(sp, 8);
+	/* For now be conservative so the resulting hashes
+	 * are not too long. 8 bytes of salt prevents dictionary
+	 * attacks well enough. */
+	sp = crypt(password, salt);
+	if (strncmp(algoid, sp, strlen(algoid)) != 0) {
+	/* libc doesn't know the algorithm, use MD5 */
+		memset(sp, '\0', strlen(sp));
+		return crypt_md5_wrapper(password);
+	}
+
+	return x_strdup(sp);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int
+unix_selinux_confined(void)
+{
+    static int confined = -1;
+    int fd;
+    char tempfile[]="/etc/.pwdXXXXXX";
+
+    if (confined != -1)
+    	return confined;
+
+    /* cannot be confined without SELinux enabled */
+    if (!SELINUX_ENABLED){
+       	confined = 0;
+       	return confined;
+    }
+
+    /* let's try opening shadow read only */
+    if ((fd=open("/etc/shadow", O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+        close(fd);
+        confined = 0;
+        return confined;
+    }
+
+    if (errno == EACCES) {
+	confined = 1;
+	return confined;
+    }
+
+    /* shadow opening failed because of other reasons let's try
+       creating a file in /etc */
+    if ((fd=mkstemp(tempfile)) != -1) {
+        unlink(tempfile);
+        close(fd);
+        confined = 0;
+        return confined;
+    }
+
+    confined = 1;
+    return confined;
+}
+
+#else
+int
+unix_selinux_confined(void)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+int
+lock_pwdf(void)
+{
+        int i;
+        int retval;
+
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+        if (unix_selinux_confined()) {
+                return PAM_SUCCESS;
+        }
+#endif
+        /* These values for the number of attempts and the sleep time
+           are, of course, completely arbitrary.
+           My reading of the PAM docs is that, once pam_chauthtok() has been
+           called with PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK, we are obliged to take any
+           reasonable steps to make sure the token is updated; so retrying
+           for 1/10 sec. isn't overdoing it. */
+        i=0;
+        while((retval = lckpwdf()) != 0 && i < 100) {
+                usleep(1000);
+                i++;
+        }
+        if(retval != 0) {
+                return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+        }
+        return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void
+unlock_pwdf(void)
+{
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+        if (unix_selinux_confined()) {
+                return;
+        }
+#endif
+        ulckpwdf();
+}
+#else
+int
+lock_pwdf(void)
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void
+unlock_pwdf(void)
+{
+	return;
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+save_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
+		  int howmany)
+{
+    static char buf[16384];
+    static char nbuf[16384];
+    char *s_luser, *s_uid, *s_npas, *s_pas, *pass;
+    int npas;
+    FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+    int err = 0;
+    int oldmask;
+    int found = 0;
+    struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+    struct stat st;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
+#endif
+
+    if (howmany < 0) {
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+    }
+
+    if (oldpass == NULL) {
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+    }
+
+    oldmask = umask(077);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+      security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
+      if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
+        return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      };
+      if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
+        freecon(passwd_context);
+        return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      }
+      if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
+        freecon(passwd_context);
+        freecon(prev_context);
+        return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      }
+      freecon(passwd_context);
+    }
+#endif
+    pwfile = fopen(OPW_TMPFILE, "w");
+    umask(oldmask);
+    if (pwfile == NULL) {
+      err = 1;
+      goto done;
+    }
+
+    opwfile = fopen(OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE, "r");
+    if (opwfile == NULL) {
+	fclose(pwfile);
+      err = 1;
+      goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+    if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    while (fgets(buf, 16380, opwfile)) {
+	if (!strncmp(buf, forwho, strlen(forwho))) {
+	    char *sptr = NULL;
+	    found = 1;
+	    if (howmany == 0)
+	    	continue;
+	    buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+	    s_luser = strtok_r(buf, ":", &sptr);
+	    s_uid = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+	    s_npas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+	    s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+	    npas = strtol(s_npas, NULL, 10) + 1;
+	    while (npas > howmany) {
+		s_pas = strpbrk(s_pas, ",");
+		if (s_pas != NULL)
+		    s_pas++;
+		npas--;
+	    }
+	    pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
+	    if (s_pas == NULL)
+		snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%s:%d:%s\n",
+			 s_luser, s_uid, npas, pass);
+	    else
+		snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf),"%s:%s:%d:%s,%s\n",
+			 s_luser, s_uid, npas, s_pas, pass);
+	    _pam_delete(pass);
+	    if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
+		err = 1;
+		break;
+	    }
+	} else if (fputs(buf, pwfile) < 0) {
+	    err = 1;
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+    fclose(opwfile);
+
+    if (!found) {
+	pwd = getpwnam(forwho);
+	if (pwd == NULL) {
+	    err = 1;
+	} else {
+	    pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
+	    snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%lu:1:%s\n",
+		     forwho, (unsigned long)pwd->pw_uid, pass);
+	    _pam_delete(pass);
+	    if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
+		err = 1;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+	D(("error writing entries to old passwords file: %m"));
+	err = 1;
+    }
+
+done:
+    if (!err) {
+	if (rename(OPW_TMPFILE, OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE))
+	    err = 1;
+    }
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+      if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
+        err = 1;
+      }
+      if (prev_context)
+        freecon(prev_context);
+      prev_context=NULL;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (!err) {
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+    } else {
+	unlink(OPW_TMPFILE);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+    }
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+unix_update_passwd(const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
+#else
+int
+unix_update_passwd(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
+#endif
+{
+    struct passwd *tmpent = NULL;
+    struct stat st;
+    FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+    int err = 1;
+    int oldmask;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
+#endif
+
+    oldmask = umask(077);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+      security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
+      if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      };
+      if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
+	freecon(passwd_context);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      }
+      if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
+	freecon(passwd_context);
+	freecon(prev_context);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      }
+      freecon(passwd_context);
+    }
+#endif
+    pwfile = fopen(PW_TMPFILE, "w");
+    umask(oldmask);
+    if (pwfile == NULL) {
+      err = 1;
+      goto done;
+    }
+
+    opwfile = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r");
+    if (opwfile == NULL) {
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+    if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
+    while (tmpent) {
+	if (!strcmp(tmpent->pw_name, forwho)) {
+	    /* To shut gcc up */
+	    union {
+		const char *const_charp;
+		char *charp;
+	    } assigned_passwd;
+	    assigned_passwd.const_charp = towhat;
+
+	    tmpent->pw_passwd = assigned_passwd.charp;
+	    err = 0;
+	}
+	if (putpwent(tmpent, pwfile)) {
+	    D(("error writing entry to password file: %m"));
+	    err = 1;
+	    break;
+	}
+	tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
+    }
+    fclose(opwfile);
+
+    if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+	D(("error writing entries to password file: %m"));
+	err = 1;
+    }
+
+done:
+    if (!err) {
+	if (!rename(PW_TMPFILE, "/etc/passwd"))
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+	    helper_log_err(
+#else
+	    pam_syslog(pamh,
+#endif
+		LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
+	else
+	    err = 1;
+    }
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+      if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
+	err = 1;
+      }
+      if (prev_context)
+	freecon(prev_context);
+      prev_context=NULL;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (!err) {
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+    } else {
+	unlink(PW_TMPFILE);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+    }
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+unix_update_shadow(const char *forwho, char *towhat)
+#else
+int
+unix_update_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, char *towhat)
+#endif
+{
+    struct spwd *spwdent = NULL, *stmpent = NULL;
+    struct stat st;
+    FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+    int err = 1;
+    int oldmask;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
+#endif
+
+    spwdent = getspnam(forwho);
+    if (spwdent == NULL) {
+	return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+    }
+    oldmask = umask(077);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+      security_context_t shadow_context=NULL;
+      if (getfilecon("/etc/shadow",&shadow_context)<0) {
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      };
+      if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
+	freecon(shadow_context);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      }
+      if (setfscreatecon(shadow_context)) {
+	freecon(shadow_context);
+	freecon(prev_context);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      }
+      freecon(shadow_context);
+    }
+#endif
+    pwfile = fopen(SH_TMPFILE, "w");
+    umask(oldmask);
+    if (pwfile == NULL) {
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    opwfile = fopen("/etc/shadow", "r");
+    if (opwfile == NULL) {
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+    if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
+    while (stmpent) {
+
+	if (!strcmp(stmpent->sp_namp, forwho)) {
+	    stmpent->sp_pwdp = towhat;
+	    stmpent->sp_lstchg = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
+	    err = 0;
+	    D(("Set password %s for %s", stmpent->sp_pwdp, forwho));
+	}
+
+	if (putspent(stmpent, pwfile)) {
+	    D(("error writing entry to shadow file: %m"));
+	    err = 1;
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
+    }
+    fclose(opwfile);
+
+    if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+	D(("error writing entries to shadow file: %m"));
+	err = 1;
+    }
+
+ done:
+    if (!err) {
+	if (!rename(SH_TMPFILE, "/etc/shadow"))
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+	    helper_log_err(
+#else
+	    pam_syslog(pamh,
+#endif
+		LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
+	else
+	    err = 1;
+    }
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+      if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
+	err = 1;
+      }
+      if (prev_context)
+	freecon(prev_context);
+      prev_context=NULL;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (!err) {
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+    } else {
+	unlink(SH_TMPFILE);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+    }
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+
+int
+helper_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok)
+{
+	struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+	char *salt = NULL;
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = get_pwd_hash(name, &pwd, &salt);
+
+	if (pwd == NULL || salt == NULL) {
+		helper_log_err(LOG_WARNING, "check pass; user unknown");
+		retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+	} else {
+		retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, nullok);
+	}
+
+	if (salt) {
+		_pam_overwrite(salt);
+		_pam_drop(salt);
+	}
+
+	p = NULL;		/* no longer needed here */
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+void
+helper_log_err(int err, const char *format, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, format);
+	openlog(HELPER_COMPILE, LOG_CONS | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
+	vsyslog(err, format, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	closelog();
+}
+
+static void
+su_sighandler(int sig)
+{
+#ifndef SA_RESETHAND
+        /* emulate the behaviour of the SA_RESETHAND flag */
+        if ( sig == SIGILL || sig == SIGTRAP || sig == SIGBUS || sig = SIGSERV )
+                signal(sig, SIG_DFL);
+#endif
+        if (sig > 0) {
+                _exit(sig);
+        }
+}
+
+void
+setup_signals(void)
+{
+        struct sigaction action;        /* posix signal structure */
+
+        /*
+         * Setup signal handlers
+         */
+        (void) memset((void *) &action, 0, sizeof(action));
+        action.sa_handler = su_sighandler;
+#ifdef SA_RESETHAND
+        action.sa_flags = SA_RESETHAND;
+#endif
+        (void) sigaction(SIGILL, &action, NULL);
+        (void) sigaction(SIGTRAP, &action, NULL);
+        (void) sigaction(SIGBUS, &action, NULL);
+        (void) sigaction(SIGSEGV, &action, NULL);
+        action.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
+        action.sa_flags = 0;
+        (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL);
+        (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &action, NULL);
+        (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &action, NULL);
+        (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &action, NULL);
+}
+
+char *
+getuidname(uid_t uid)
+{
+        struct passwd *pw;
+        static char username[256];
+
+        pw = getpwuid(uid);
+        if (pw == NULL)
+                return NULL;
+
+        strncpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username));
+        username[sizeof(username) - 1] = '\0';
+
+        return username;
+}
+
+int
+read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords)
+{
+        int rbytes = 0;
+        int offset = 0;
+        int i = 0;
+        char *pptr;
+        while (npass > 0) {
+                rbytes = read(fd, passwords[i]+offset, MAXPASS-offset);
+
+                if (rbytes < 0) {
+                        if (errno == EINTR) continue;
+                        break;
+                }
+                if (rbytes == 0)
+                        break;
+
+                while (npass > 0 && (pptr=memchr(passwords[i]+offset, '\0', rbytes))
+                        != NULL) {
+                        rbytes -= pptr - (passwords[i]+offset) + 1;
+                        i++;
+                        offset = 0;
+                        npass--;
+                        if (rbytes > 0) {
+                                if (npass > 0)
+                                        memcpy(passwords[i], pptr+1, rbytes);
+                                memset(pptr+1, '\0', rbytes);
+                        }
+                }
+                offset += rbytes;
+        }
+
+        /* clear up */
+        if (offset > 0 && npass > 0) {
+                memset(passwords[i], '\0', offset);
+        }
+
+        return i;
+}
+
+#endif
+/* ****************************************************************** *
+ * Copyright (c) Jan Rêkorajski 1999.
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan 1996-8.
+ * Copyright (c) Alex O. Yuriev, 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Cristian Gafton 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 1996, 2007, 2008.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */